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Abstract
There is a class of models for pol/mil/econ bargaining and conflict that is loosely based on the Median
Voter Theorem which has been used with great success for about 30 years. However, there are fundamental
mathematical limitations to these models. They apply to issues which can be represented on a single one-
dimensional continuum, like degree of centralization of a government, or cartel members negotiating the
price to ask for their commodity. They represent fundamental group decision process by a deterministic
Condorcet Election. There has been some extension to multidimensional issue sets, but they are not
well documented and are limited to cases where the difference between policies is well approximated by
a Euclidean distance and each actor’s utility is monotonically declining in distance. This work provides
a methodology for addressing a broader class of problems.
The first extension is to continuous issue sets where the consequences of policies are not well-described
by a distance measure or utility is not monotonic in distance. Simple one-dimensional examples are
discussed. The difficulty is more acute in multidimensional policy spaces. An example is the negotiations
over national economic policies, where the effects differ by region, by industrial sector, and by social
group. Further, even a weighted sum over the effects can be non-monotonic or multi-peaked.
The second fundamental extension is to inherently discrete issue sets. The discussion will focus on
subset selection problems, though the methodology is not limited to them. Two examples are the selection
of which subset of competing parties will form a parliament (and which will be excluded), or the selection
of a portfolio of defense projects. In the parliament formation case, the utility of a potential parliament
to each actor can be modeled as a look-ahead by that actor in order to consider the various policies which
that parliament might choose. This models a two-stage process, where the uncertainty in the second stage
(choices on issues) is an important factor in the first stage (choices of parliaments). Because there are
generally more issues than parties, the discrete choices in the first stage embody trade-offs in the second
stage. Because the options cannot easily be mapped into a multidimensional space so that the utility
depends on distance, we refer to it as a non-spatial issue set.
The third, but most fundamental, extension is to represent the negotiating process as a probabilistic
Condorcet election. This provides the flexibility to make the first two extensions possible; this flexibility
comes at the cost of less precise predictions and more complex validation. Because the analyses are
inherently probabilistic, this provides a smooth "response surface" for expected utility, thus simplifying
strategy optimization even in discrete issue sets. Some common bargaining algorithms are inapplicable
in the more general issue sets addressed here. For example, power-weighted interpolation between the
positions of two actors is often inapplicable in continuous but multimodal issue sets. More fundamentally,
interpolation is unusable in discrete issue sets because continuous interpolation is not even defined between
discrete options.
We provide motivation and overview of the general methodology followed by mathematical details.
The methodology has been implemented in two proof-of-concept prototypes which address the subset
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selection problem of forming a parliament, and strategy optimization for one-dimensional issues. Both
prototypes can explore the effect of altering many parameters and sub-models.
Keywords: Multi-agent Models; Collective Decision Making; Public Choice; Bounded
Rationality; Agent-Based Simulation; Voting Behavior; Social Simulation
1 Problem and State of the Art
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Many political, military, and/or economic disputes involve bargaining and conflict between powerful
groups. They can be modeled as thousands to millions of small actors, or as a small number of larger actors;
we consider the latter class of models. Game theory, economics, and public choice theory all play important
roles in different contexts, but one common theme is the use of models loosely based on the Median Voter
Theorem (MVT). There is a vast amount of academic analysis, formal modeling tools , and popular political
commentary based on the same concepts, which we will collectively refer to as spatial political models (SPM).1
We present a methodology called Non-spatial Probabilistic Condorcet Elections (NPCE) and describe some
advantages and disadvantages compared to SPM. This is not the only way to approach the problem of CE
which lack winners. Some approaches avoid the CE concept entirely, some retain the idea of a CE but
add some probabilistic elements. The usual probabilistic approach is to model the CE as a deterministic
function with stochastic parameters. As explained below, our approach treats the CE itself as stochastic, i.e.
a stochastic function even with deterministic parameters.
[PT02] gives a succinct motivation: "the probabilistic voting approach was developed in the spatial voting
model to guarantee the existence of equilibrium in situations, such as multidimensional policy space, in which
a Condorcet winner fails to exist; see Coughlin 1992 for an overview of probabilistic voting and Osborne (1995)
for an overview of spatial voting theory" (the two citations are [PC92] and [MO95] respectively).
The SPM analyze the behavior of “actors”, which can stand for formal political parties, informal factions,
prominent families, nation states, ethnic groups, social classes, industry groups, and so on. The issues over
which they struggle and/or negotiate are represented as a continuum of choices, e.g. the degree of pro-
US or anti-US alignment, price of a cartel’s commodity, level of social services, location of facilities, level
of troop commitment to a war, and so on. The general ability of each actor to influence an outcome is
their “capability”, which could reflect religious authority, available campaign funds, armed soldiers, size of an
ethnic voting bloc, GDP, or whatever is relevant to the situation being analyzed. Voting is generalized from
a formal process of counting ballots to the more general concept of exerting capability in order to influence
outcomes: “voting with their feet”, “voting with their guns”, expending campaign funds to defeat a political
opponent, expending strike funds to coerce an employer, and so on. The set of actors, the issues, and their
capabilities are generally estimated by careful expert analysis before the SPM are applicable. The actors’
capabilities would then summarize the results of those analyses. Expert interpretation of the model output
is also necessary, as the true meaning of the output depends on how the inputs were defined and estimated.
A great many studies support the idea that SPM are accurate descriptive models of US domestic politics,
especially spending issues. [PD85] analyzed all the recorded votes in the US Congress and concluded that
80%-90% can be explained by the uni-dimensional SPM.
The SPM predict that there will be a clear order of public choice, without cyclic preferences, which was
confirmed analysis of Congressional votes over district specific grants [TS96]. Several studies [CS90, CB95]
1The “spatial model of politics” appears to have a somewhat more restricted usage in the literature.
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found strong evidence that SPM are better models of legislative decisions on large scale public programs than
are other interest group models.
Nevertheless, there are well-known situations, both theoretical and practical, in which the SPM could be
improved upon. Some issues are normative and some are descriptive; this work considers only the descriptive.
Many overall discussions of the problems exist, including [CR84, RH89, PE12] . Some of the issues will be
discussed below in the context of explaining the NPCE. To see how the NPCE methodology is fundamentally
different from the SPM, we examine an even older analytic construct on which they are both based: the
concept of a Condorcet winner (CW). Just before the French Revolution, [MdC85] introduced the CW in
the context of designing group decision procedures (especially elections) which were fair according to some
unarguable “gold standard”. A deterministic “Condorcet election” (DCE) is the infeasible procedure of pairing
every option against every other in one-on-one contests; the CW is that option which would win against every
other option. Any feasible choice procedure which always chooses the CW is Condorcet consistent.
Even in theory, not every election has a CW, though several special kinds of elections do. In 1950, Duncan
Black published a special case of Condorcet’s approach, the MVT, which assumes the following [DB48]:
• Policy options (positions advocated and outcomes experienced) can be expressed as a single number
(e.g. level of troop commitment) which is one-dimensional, bounded, and continuous.
• While each actor may have a different preference function, each function must be unimodal and mono-
tonically declining in distance from their most-preferred option
• In any choice between two options, each actor exerts all their capability toward whichever is preferable
to them. Because each utility curve slopes down away from the actor’s position, this means that they
vote for whichever option is closer to their own.
• The group vote is the sum of the individual votes between options.
• Group choices between options are deterministic.
The MVT states that under these conditions, a CW does exist and is the median voter position, where half
the total capability is on either side. Notice that if there are gaps between the positions of different groups,
the actor holding the CW can shift its position and thus shift the group outcome. Thus, they have the
power to control the outcome, as long as they do not move so far that some other actor becomes the CW.
While some actors are inflexibly committed to hold their position, some actors are motivated by the desire
to hold the decision power and enjoy its benefits. For the latter, there is a strong incentive to occupy the
CW position.
Because the CW cannot be defeated by any other proposal, it is the predicted outcome of a group
bargaining process. Any actor proposing an option closer to the CW has a winning proposal, power-seekers
always have a motive to do so, and once the CW is proposed, nothing can defeat it. Thus, with free
introduction of proposals, the CW is the predicted outcome of a group bargaining process. In particular,
when the “options” are different candidates running for election, this means first appealing to the median
voter of their party’s primary election, then appealing to the median voter of the overall multiparty election.
The fact that those two medians usually differ appears to be the origin of the popular political maxim that
politicians must always “run to the center” after the primary.2
2A great deal of political commentary and analysis deals with the issues of how to effectively stake out a position near the
median of the primary electorate even though primary voters expect a run-to-the-middle later, and how to effectively stake out
a position near the median of the general electorate even after the general voters saw the primary position. The tactics of how
best to adopt positions or to exert influence are not considered in this paper.
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Some of the SPM generalize this approach somewhat to a multidimensional space, but they still require
unimodal, monotonically declining preferences on a continuous set of options. The status of multidimensional
SPM is quite complicated, largely because Generalized Mean Voter Theorem states that the multidimensional
analog of the MVT holds only under restrictive symmetry conditions.
1.1 Normative vs. Descriptive
In our context, the CW is taken as purely descriptive, not normative. While the CW may have some
normative content in some contexts, it is important to understand that it cannot be assumed that the CW
represents any sort of collegial agreement or compromise pleasing to both sides. It might represent an
explicit agreement between negotiators, or it might represent the outcome of a group process in which no
party explicitly negotiates.
Similarly, the “election” and “bargaining” process could be formal, explicit, and professional, or it could be
the implicit outcome of group dynamics. We do not assume the absence of coercion, so the relative capability
of parties will greatly affect the bargains and compromises reached. Where coercion is possible, the dynamic
is similar to an out-of-court settlement or an armed threat: If actor A is much stronger than B, he can
unilaterally create a situation of potential conflict. In this case, the “bargain” to avoid a clash will likely
be a very harsh one which B would have avoided if he were stronger. Consider the example of an armed
robbery. The “reference situation” of open conflict is that the victim dies and the robber takes the money.
For the victim to surrender the wallet is the outcome of Nash’s model of bargaining because each is better
off than the reference situation (see [JN50]): the victim loses their money but stays alive, and the robber
gets the money and avoids a murder charge. Where coercion is not possible, the reference situation is simply
the status quo in case of no agreement, or what the parties can achieve unilaterally; this is what negotiators
refer to as “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” or BATNA.
As discussed in [JW95], Nash emphasized that his model was applicable to conscious agents with explicit
foresight (the “rational actor” model) as well as more unconscious, evolutionary processes (the “mass action”
model). While bargains could be explicitly negotiated as written agreements, they also could implicitly
evolve without communication, such as the evolution of tacit truces between artillery on opposite sides of the
trenches in WWI. An example implicit process would be the continual adjustment of each side’s behavior and
propaganda to the other side’s behavior and propaganda, even if neither side thought of itself as explicitly
bargaining; see section (41).
A simple example was given (from the Northern perspective) in Lincoln’s Second Inaugural address:
Both parties deprecated war, but one of them would make war rather than let the nation survive,
and the other would accept war rather than let it perish, and the war came.
This can be seen as the CW between the North and the South, where each preferred peace to war, but each
preferred war to the other’s peace. Hence, war is the CW option, even though neither party alone would have
chosen it. Thus, the issue set must be constructed to include a wider set of options than either actor would
choose alone, as it must also include both desirable and undesirable “compromises”, the results of failure to
formally agree (e.g. the coming or continuation of civil war, the continuation of status quo if no legislation
is passed), and so on. In the SPM, all possible positions can be represented by numerical coordinates, but
non-spatial models raise subtle issues.
Some authors argue a desirable property of normative decision rules is join-consistency: if group A alone
chooses option X , and group B alone chooses option X , then groups A and B together should also choose
option X . Some argue that the mere fact of merger might in some cases change the context, so that join-
consistency cannot be specified as an iron-clad rule for all situations. From a descriptive perspective, it is
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easy to cite examples of join-inconsistency, such as two small, effective organizations which merge to form one
larger organization that takes ineffective actions which neither component would choose. This is illustrated
by the proverb that “a camel is a race horse designed by a committee”: each member might design their
own kind of race horse, but because they are different the group can not agree on a single good design and
incorporates contributions from each member, even when they are inconsistent with each other.
Deliberately echoing the Civil War example, each side preferred a horse to a camel, but each preferred a
camel to the other’s horse. This can happen because any complex option has a large set of possible attributes.
When considering the infinite space of designs, group A’s design of a “fast racer” might be quite different in
detail from group B’s design of a “fast racer”. The fact that both are denoted as “option X” obscures the fact
that they might diverge in very significant ways, though they share the abstract characterization of “fast”.
Again, North would have chosen “peace” and the South would also have chosen “peace”, but their ideas of
peace were so divergent that the CW of both together was war. From a purely non-normative perspective,
the requirement of join-consistency appears to be violated by actual examples.3
The design example raises the issue of explicit enumeration of small issue sets versus implicit definition
of infinite issue sets. More discussion can be found in section 3.7.
2 Overview of NPCE
The "non-spatial probabilistic Condorcet election" (NPCE) methodology starts with the same concept of a
Condorcet Election, but diverges even before the MVT. The NPCE methodology treats the group choices be-
tween options as probabilistic, rather than deterministic. It generalizes the deterministic Condorcet approach
to handle a more general set of cases at the cost of providing less specific predictions and requiring somewhat
more computational resources. Given modern computing infrastructure, e.g. on-demand provisioning via
cloud computing, this is not a serious limitation.
The NPCE methodology is open to specialization for problems with unique structure, analogous to the
situation with linear programming. Linear programming (LP) is a very general and powerful methodology,
but many problems have special structures that are utilized by specialized algorithms to compute the same
result more efficiently. Classic LP examples include transshipment algorithms which assume a network of
balanced, positive flows. It is well-known that deterministic CW exist and can be efficiently computed for
certain network location problems [DR78, HT81]. Some macroeconomic problems also have CW, under
restrictive assumptions about the actors’ utility functions (e.g. all identical Cobb-Douglas); examples are
discussed in [OR04]. More directly, there is a large literature on exploiting matrix structure to compute
various kinds of eignevectors, which is quite similar to the core NPCE problem of computing a limiting
distribution over possible CW; we fully expect that analogous special structures can be utilized for NPCE.
The new NPCE methodology extends the state of the art in several ways:
• Non-deterministic: The methodology is designed to identify likely outcomes and interactions, as well
as estimate the associated risk, opportunities, and variability.
3It could be objected that this is a false counter example, because there were two distinct options, “Northern-peace” and
“Southern-peace”, not a single option “peace” which was selected by both North and South alone. By this logic, join-consistency
is preserved, because there never was a single option which each alone would select. However, this same logic calls into question
the entire rationale of join-consistency, because real world agreements on a single option almost always mask differences in detail
of definition and implementation, so that the two parties never choose exactly the same option down to the last detail: there
are essentially always distinct options, and the pre-conditions of join-consistency are almost never met. Apparently, the most
that can be said is that join-consistency applies in those cases where the differences are not important and it does not apply in
those cases where the differences do matter.
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• Discrete Options: Support the analysis of not only continuous gradations of policy but also discrete,
combinatorial choices
• The Value of Outcomes: Extend the state of the art to look at the value to actors of real-world outcomes
generated by policies, not just differences in the policies.
• Differing perceptions of policy space: The NPCE methodology does not require that the parties to a
dispute all have the same characterization of how choices are ordered or placed.
2.1 Deterministic vs. Non-deterministic
The SPM appear to be built on the assumption that political processes are largely deterministic. In a
legislative vote where one position gets 11 votes and the other get 10, then the former is the unambiguous
winner. The published analytical models do not appear to include any provision for uncertain outcomes and
appear to use expected-value computations throughout, ultimately producing a single point prediction of a
single forecast outcome, given particular input parameters. Much of the literature on CW and probability
appears to focus upon the probability that a CW will result from a deterministic CE, for various models
of stochastic voter preferences. That is, the CW is considered as a deterministic function with stochastic
parameters.
While deterministic outcomes seem quite realistic when analyzing formal elections with ballots, it becomes
questionable when comparing the generalized “voting” mentioned earlier. For example, if two equally strong
interest groups try to influence legislators to get their preferred outcome, then either one is equally likely
to prevail. This can be taken as the operational definition of “equal capability”, as is often done in systems
to rank the capability of chess players, sports teams, and so on. Thus, expert opinion or prior statistics on
relative odds can be used to derive relative capabilities via paired comparison techniques. When they are
slightly mismatched, the odds can be expected to shift slightly, rather than snapping to a deterministic all-or-
nothing outcome. This suggests that the CW could be considered as a stochastic function with deterministic
parameters.
The simplest model is that the probability of success in each one-on-one contest depends on the relative
capabilities of the actors involved:
p [i ≻ j] =
ci
ci + cj
(1)
Zermelo’s original chess ranking function [EZ28], the Bradley-Terry model [BT52], the Glicko model
[MG99] for sports teams and many others [WL11] are examples. While many alternative variations are
discussed in the literature, most are transformations of equation (1). However, the core of the NPCE
methodology is the technique of using probabilistic contests; equation (1) is a sub-model which can be varied
based on the problem at hand.
Unlike methodologies based on DCE and the MVT, the NPCE methodology is designed from the foun-
dations to represent this stochastic aspect of political/military/economic struggles. The standard “forecast”
is a probability distribution over the possible outcomes. A disadvantage of the NPCE is that while the MVT
provides the strong prediction of a single outcome, the NPCE provides a weaker prediction of probabilities.4
Adopting a probabilistic perspective is a fundamental change from the DCE and MVT and work built
upon them. In particular, the strict problem structure necessary to make the strong prediction of a single
4When the CW exists, it is usually ranked as the most probable outcome. When the CW defeats other options by wide
margins, it is much more likely than other options. When the CW just barely defeats other options, it may be slightly more or
less likely than the alternatives.
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outcome is no longer necessary. This one change opens the door to a broad range of new problems areas
including (but not limited to) multidimensional choices, discrete choices, and domain-specific utility models.
This breadth comes at a price. First, less precise conclusions can be drawn. Second, with only statistical
predictions, validation is more challenging. Third, models of dynamics and bargaining tailored to DCE and
MVT, in SPM, are no longer applicable.
2.1.1 Strategy Optimization
Deterministic SPM often exhibit the following properties. Because a small shift in the CW actor shifts the
predicted outcome, while small shifts in all other actors has no effect, efforts to use SPM to plan strategies
often focus on actors at the median position, especially when they are powerful. With discrete options, strat-
egy optimization with deterministic models has the difficulty that the response surface (predicted outcome
as a function of the actor capabilities) is discontinuous, as the prediction is either one discrete outcome or
another: the response is everywhere perfectly flat except where it is discontinuous.
With NPCE, the prediction is not a single outcome but a distribution over outcomes. Even for the case
of discrete options, the distribution is a continuous function of the input parameters, so the expected value of
the result is a continuous function of the input parameters. The availability of continuous slope information
makes it possible to bring many powerful optimization techniques to bear in order to suggest novel strategies.
In the case of one-dimensional models, the NPCE can be used to evaluate strategies that do not necessarily
focus immediately on the CW actor. While influencing the first-tier actors is always an option to be analyzed,
the NPCE makes it easier to analyze the potential for shifting the odds in one’s favor by influencing second-tier
actors.
The NPCE methodology also facilitates analyzing the robustness of outcomes and strategies, for both
continuous and discrete issue sets. For example, suppose an analyst is looking for strategies to influence a
group so as to select option X. The predicted distribution for strategy A might indicate option X was the
most likely, but only by a slim margin. With a different strategy B, option X might still be the most likely,
but by a large margin. While a deterministic analysis might simply indicate option X in both cases, the
NPCE will provide the additional information that strategy A is more risky, in the sense of having higher
RMS deviation from one’s goal.
2.2 Continuous vs. Discrete Options
The SPM represent multiple political choices as points in a continuous, multidimensional space, where each
dimension represents an independent sub-issue. Each point defines an overall policy which an actor could
advocate and/or a policy compromise among several actors. A large class of problems which do not fit the
SPM paradigm are subset selection problems (SSP). We will consider two: interest groups selecting parties
to form a government, and managers choosing projects to form a research program.
The composition of a government coalition is discrete, not continuous: each party is either in or out.
Similarly, the assignments of cabinet seats to coalition members are inherently discrete: it is impossible
to assign 2.3 cabinet seats to a party. Thus, neither of these problems can be represented well in SPM.
The problem cna be represented as multistage, because the choice of government in the first stage strongly
influences the policy outcomes in the second stage.
Because each party has a slate of policy preferences, a choice between one ruling party and another might
have implications for several issues at once: free markets vs. central planning, extensive or minimal rights
for women, orientation toward America or Russia, and so on. Because there are generally more policy issues
in play than there are parties, choosing which party to back (or which party to get a cabinet seat) inevitably
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involves tradeoffs between those issues. Notice that this is a completely different mechanism to address policy
tradeoffs than is used in multidimensional SPM.
Once in power, the parties may cooperate via “logrolling” pairs of issues where each does a favor for the
other. Finally, all these interactions are anticipated in the struggles over how to form a government, as every
actor is trying to shape the final outcome. The NPCE methodology can be used by analysts to examine how
the actors involved might address the discrete choices in forming a government, in light of their understanding
of the multistage nature of the process.
There are fundamental reasons why the discrete structure of a government cannot be easily summarized
into a single number, greatly limiting the ability of SPM to address these tradeoffs. When there are a
half-dozen parties competing to get into the government, then each alternative outcomes is simply a subset
specifying which get in and which are left out. This can be represented by a simple list of 1’s and 0’s, which
is more like the evenly spaced corners of a unit hypercube than a continuous line segment. Any scheme to
reduce it to a simple continuum (e.g. Hamming distance from a given corner) inevitably maps significantly
different points onto each other, thus obscuring the difference between alternatives. With m parties, there
are 2m options for which subset is “in” and which is “out”, with the widest diversity of options at the level
of 50% in and 50% out. An analogy would be to categorize every point on the globe by its distance from
the Entebbe airport and then placing them on a line: places as dissimilar as the North Pole, Vietnam, the
Indian Ocean, the South Pole, and the North Atlantic would all collapse to the point representing “halfway
around the world”.
While policy options can be mapped to [0,1] vectors and thus to the corners a hypercube, the utilities
common in SSP are poorly represented by a weighted Euclidean distance; an example is discussed below. A
generalization of the SSP is to determine a matching. Given a dozen factions and six cabinet seats, each
possible matching can be represented by a six-element list of which factions get to control each seat. With
n seats and m factions, there are nm possible ways to match them up. Because neither seats nor factions
are naturally ordered, (unlike the 0/1 alternatives for whether a party is in the coalition or not) there is no
obvious way to place all the matchings on the corners a hypercube. Again, there is (in general) no way to
reduce a matching to a single number without potentially losing critical information. For example, a large
pro-US faction might be forced to cooperate with a small but very anti-US faction by granting them one out
of five seats in the cabinet, so that every possible cabinet is 80% pro-US and 20% anti-US. However, it is
important whether that seat controls farm policy or the entire military: we would like to disaggregate the
single 80% number into a matching of factions with seats.
2.3 Policies vs. Outcomes
SPM postulate that the attractiveness of a policy option to a decision maker depends on the weighted
Euclidean distance between that policy option and the decision maker’s preferred option: their own option
is best, and desirability declines as “distance in policy space” increases. Technically, their utility function is
unimodal and monotonically declining with distance. Thus, to fit a problem into the SPM framework, one
must define a single continuous space (and weighted distance measures on it), so that every actor’s preference
function becomes unimodal and monotonically declining. As described below, there are many important
cases when this is not possible even with continuous options.
2.3.1 Multiple Peaks
It frequently turns out that the desirability of a policy choice is not single-peaked in any distance measure.
As we will demonstrate, this can be a problem even for unidimensional issues.
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One classic example is a policy choice over the level of troops to commit to a war. One actor’s best option
might be to commit a high number of troops in order to win decisively, next-best to commit a low number as
non-provocative observers, and least desirable to commit a middle amount: enough to suffer large casualties
but not enough for a significant chance of victory. For this actor, the preference ordering of policies, based
on military outcome, be H > L > M . When this actor’s utility is graphed versus number of troops, there
are peaks at both extremes and a dip in the middle (the proverbial “worst of both worlds”).
The case of public bads has been analyzed in [GA12]. This situation is characterized by a unidimensional
scale, where each actor’s utility function has a single triangular dip, with perfectly flat indifference regions
on either side. The situation of multiple dips or peaks in each utility function, or having multiple dimensions
or discrete options, is not analyzed.
Because actors have different utility functions, each actor might have different number of dips and peaks,
located in different places. The SPM are inherently unable to represent actor’s preferences in such situations
where benefit has multiple peaks. The fundamental problem is that actors often care about outcomes that
are non-monotonic in policy.
2.3.2 Multiple Orders
Frequently, actors will value options by different criteria, because they value the outcomes by different
criteria. This is just one of several reasons why it is generally impossible to map discrete options into a single
distance measure for all actors: while Hamming distance might be appropriate for one actor’s valuation of
the consequences, it is not therefore automatically appropriate for another actor who values the consequences
differently. In the example of troop commitments, one actor, A, might order the desirability of alternative
by the military outcome, giving H > L > M discussed earlier. Another actor, B, might be concerned with
cost, giving the L > M > H ordering. Of course, for any given actor, the alternative policies could be sorted
according to how good the outcome was for that actor (with some overlaps). It is simple to enumerate all
six orders of L,M,H to verify that none make A’s utility function unimodal and B’s unimodal at the same
time.5
Because actors can have arbitrary preferences over outcomes, there is in no way to define any distance
measure which gives the correct preference ordering for all actors when combined with a unimodal, mono-
tonically declining utility measure. Even in the uni-dimensional continuous case, there is not always an
embedding of the options so that they are placed in one order for one actor, while appearing to be in a
completely different order for another actor; the troop deployment problem provides an example. The NPCE
methodology completely avoids this problem by working directly with actor’s individual utility of outcomes,
without trying to collapse them all into a single measure of distance in a common policy space.
2.3.3 Domain Specific Utilities
The SPM treat options basically as points in continuous space, where some measure of distance determines
utility. Even when actors embed policy options in space differently, the basic spatial concept applies. However,
there are many cases where the spatial analogy is quite strained. A simple example is the SSP of which
research projects to fund and which not to fund. Each option can be represented as a discrete choice of which
subset of projects to fund. Relative to a set of research goals, the utility of the top-level discrete choices
depends not on a measure of “distance in policy space” but on an estimate of the real-world consequences.
Because of the potentially complex precedence and complementarity relations between projects, utility can
5This situation is superficially similar to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [KA50]. However, Arrow’s theorem applies when
each individual’s preferences are defined by a total order without numeric weights, so it is not applicable to situations where
choices have numerical weights, such as range voting or the generalized voting considered in this work.
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be highly non-monotonic in any total or partial order (rather like a combinatorial auction). For selection
of defense projects, complex non-monotonic considerations of tactics, available industrial base, strategy, and
geography are necessary: detailed modeling and analysis are often required before the summary assessments
of utility can be used as actors’ estimates of the utility.
Of course, it is possible that a more bureaucratically minded actor might evaluate options purely by
how many of their agency’s favored programs are included and how many of rival agencies’ programs are
excluded. Because the NPCE methodology does not assume actors have the same utility function, including
both research oriented and bureaucratically oriented actors presents no difficulty.
The NPCE methodology represents this situation by using sub-models which mimic the process by which
actors anticipate the consequences of their choices, and value their choices according to their expected value
of the consequences. In the case of funding research tasks, one plausible sub-model would be a probabilistic
PERT chart for the tasks. It not assumed that each actor has the same model, that any are objectively
correct, or even that they agree on what the consequences are likely to be. The model of their expectations
is termed a domain specific utility model (DSUM).
As mentioned earlier, the choice of what government to form (or which cabinet positions to assign to
which coalition members) can be modeled as turning on an estimate of the various policies which might
result from that government. The example DSUM considered in this case assigns values to each top-level
choice of government by invoking sub-models for each issue; each sub-model is another copy of the NPCE for
the corresponding one-dimensional issue, parametrized for that particular government’s composition. The
RMS deviations from that actor’s ideal result on each issue are separately estimated (i.e. no logrolling across
issues by different members of the government), then combined with the actor’s salience for each issue to
derive a final utility for that government. Thus, the DSUM mimics the actor’s foresight as to the likely range
of outcomes from their choice of government.
Another example is the design of tax and subsidy policies or economic stimulus packages in a multiregional
country: there are multiple groups affected by each policy choice, groups are often affected in different ways,
regions are affected in different ways, and effects can easily be non-monotonic in the size or targeting of a
policy. Political actors are likely to weigh the benefits to their own constituency heavily, while weighting the
effect on others’ constituencies quite differently. Similar considerations apply to multinational models.
3 Details of NPCE
Rather like linear programming, the core NPCE methodology is simple and abstract enough to be stated in
just a few equations: (13), (17), and 19. This section is devoted to examining the implications and usage of
the equations, as well as presenting various options for some of the sub-models which support the equations.
Like linear programming, there is an “art and science” of building a model within the framework, and another
science to configuring and solving the models efficiently.
3.1 Model Variations
There are many choices at each stage of the model-building process. Basic structure of the issue set, domain
specific utility functions, voting rules, third-party commitment, and search strategy are just some of those
available. Almost all combinations yield a model in which no deterministic CE exists, necessitating the use of
probabilistic voting models as explained in section (1). The basic NPCE methodology has been implemented
in several prototypes whose main purpose is to explore the effect of varying those assumptions in both
continuous and discrete issue sets, so that in each problem the important assumptions can be identified
for further study. With its “Chinese menu” of options, more model structures can be created than can be
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discussed here: most variants are not discussed in the literature, some new variants are likely to be useful,
but many will not.
For each of several sub-models, each prototype supports several sub-models (e.g. voting rules from
equations (2), (3), (7) and more), but we will generally limit discussion in this paper to sub-models whose
behavior can be described in fairly simple equations (e.g. binary or proportional voting). Thus, many of the
equations which follow describe the behavior of the generic numeric methods when applied with particular
sub-models (e.g. voting rule, third party commitment, etc.) but do not appear in the software: they only
describe the behavior for that particular set of modeling options. The software uses only the top-level
equations and generic numeric methods, which can be applied to a wider range of options than admit simple
analytic solutions.
3.2 Issue sets
The set of possible positions on an issue define the issue set. It may be explicitly given, such as the set of all
integer values from 0% to 100%, or it could be an implicit definition of an enormous combinatorial set, such
as the set of possible organizational charts.
For NPCE, no more structure is required. The key steps in defining an issue set for SPM are the following:
• Define a distance metric, d, on the set of alternatives, {θi}. The most common way to do this is to
associate one or a few numerical coordinates with each option, then use a weighted Euclidean distance
metric on those coordinates. Any distance metric must obey the standard definition:
– Non-negative: d(θi, θj) ≥ 0
– Identity of indiscernibles : d(θi, θj) = 0⇔ θi = θj
– Symmetry: d(θi, θj) = d(θj , θi)
– Triangle inequality: d(θi, θk) ≤ d(θi, θj) + d(θj , θk).
• Define an indexed family of utility functions which are declining in distance: d(θi, θj) < d(θi, θk) ⇔
Ui(θj) > Ui(θk)
Notice that, taken together, these conditions imply that each actor ranks their own position higher than any
other distinct position: ∀θi 6= θj Ui(θi) > Ui(θj)
As discussed earlier, it is not always possible to construct the (d, Ui) required for the SPM.
3.3 Voting
Given a choice between two alternatives, α : β, the effort an actor will exert to promote one or the other
is called his “vote”; it is determined by his “capability”, ci and the difference in utility to him of the two
alternatives.6 As mentioned earlier, “voting” is generalized to mean the exertion of capability in order to
affect outcomes. Positive favors option α, while negative favors option β. Voting can be over many kinds of
alternatives: positions currently held by actors, alliances with other actors, bargains struck between actors to
define new positions, and more. We follow the von Neumann convention of bounding utility by 0 ≤ Ui(α) ≤ 1.
6Note that the models in [BDMFS94, BDMNR85, BDM84] do not fit this model, because they assign utility not to the
positions of actors but to changes in those positions. We will denote the particular formula to calculate utility to actor i of a
change in state from S1 to S2 as Ui(S1, S2). It can not be represented as the difference between utilities of individual states,
because the utility for no change at all is assigned a positive value; see [BDMNR85] page 52. While Ui(S1, S1) > 0 for every
state S1, there is no function u so that u(S1)− u(S1) > 0. Therefore, the work described in this paper does not apply to those
models or to models based upon them.
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3.3.1 Voting Rules
The binary voting rule is as follows:
vi(α : β) =


+ci if Ui(α) > Ui(β)
−ci if Ui(α) < Ui(β)
0 if Ui(α) = Ui(β)
(2)
This all-or-nothing behavior is a good model of casting yes/no votes (weighted or not), but in many cases
of exerting informal influence, a more nuanced exertion of effort is observed. One simple model of nuanced
voting is that actors exert effort in strict proportion to what is at stake for them between the two alternatives:
vi(α : β) = ci[Ui(α)− Ui(β)] (3)
For example, environmental interest groups might spend only a small amount of effort on unimportant
issues, while expending a great deal of time, money, and attention on issues they view as critical. As derived
in [BW10a, BW10b] and published in [EJ11], proportional voting leads to CW under extremely general
conditions. The proof is quite simple:
V (α : β) =
∑
i vi(α : β)
=
∑
i ci[Ui(α)− Ui(β)]
=
∑
i ciUi(α) −
∑
i ciUi(β)
= ω (α)− ω (β)
(4)
where
ω (x) =
∑
i
ciUi(x) (5)
Similar to Black’s original proof of the MVT, actors seeking office always have a motive to propose options
with higher ω values, leading the group to the “Central Position” as the maximum; we call this the Central
Position Theorem (CPT). The difficulty of maximizing ω can range from very easy to very difficult, depending
on the properties of the utility functions and set of options. A special case is analyzed in Corollary 4.4 of
[PC92] assuming a probabilistic Luce model of weighted binary voting, over a continuous, convex, compact
set of options with a particular exponential form for the probabilities.
With the von-Neumann scaled utilities of this paper, the resulting probability of the i-th actor voting for
option α over β is simply the following:
pi(α : β) =
1 + Ui(α) − Ui(β)
2
(6)
When the actual votes between options are set equal to their expected values under these assumptions of
[PC92], then the position maximizing equation (5) is the voting equilibrium.
While proportional voting is a common modeling choice, there are well-known cases where the proportional
rule does not appear to hold. There is a well-known lobbying rule to “focus benefits and diffuse costs” which
suggests that equation (3) does not hold in this case. Suppose the US Congress creates a program which draws
1.5 billion dollars from general tax revenue to confer benefits on a constituency of ten thousand people. The
benefit to the constituents is $150,000 to each of 10,000 people. If there are effectively 150 million taxpayers,
then the cost is only about $10 each. Assuming for now that utility is proportional to dollars and that each
affected individual has equal capability to exert influence, the strict linearity of equation (3) implies that the
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influence of the few but highly motivated supporters would be exactly neutralized by the net influence of
the numerous but weakly motivated opponents. However, it is well known that such diffuse costs are largely
ignored by those effected, leading to the lobbying advice. To model this situation, the cubic rule is designed
to have a shallow slope for small changes, but steep slope for large ones. This reflects the lobbying rule so
that voters harmed are in the shallow region while voters helped are in the steep region.
vi(α : β) = ci[Ui(α)− Ui(β)]
3 (7)
One can imagine many other alternative voting rules, such as linear mixture of cubic, proportional, and
cubic. Most such rules have not been extensively studied; this may be because they are not algebraically
tractable, do not reliably produce CW with DCE in common cases, or both. Though it seems to reflect the
empirical experience of lobbyists, this author has found no discussion of the cubic voting rule, or its CE/CW
properties, in the literature.
Regardless of the individual voting rule, the net vote of the group between the alternatives is just the
sum of the individual votes. Note that inter-subjective comparisons of utility is never done; only capability
to exert power is compared. This is why it is important that the changes in utilities be in a fixed range (e.g.
[−1,+1] models with utility on a [0, 1] scale): the limits of actions by actors should be determined by their
relative capability to exert power, not by the scale on which their utilities happen to be measured.
V (α : β) =
∑
i
vi(α : β) (8)
If this quantity is positive, then we say that the group prefers α over β, though weaker players may
strongly disagree. In this sense, the stronger actors can force through outcomes against the wishes of weaker
actors. This is normal and expected in democratic elections: if one interest group (aka “actor”) gets 70% of
the vote, then the majority wins, even if the remaining 30% still would have preferred the other candidate.
On the other hand, the CW might not be very desirable to any actors, even though it is the best the group
can decide upon.
As mentioned above, the strong CW is defined to be that option α which defeats all others:
∀β 6= α V (α : β) > 0 (9)
The weak CW loses to none:
∀β V (α : β) ≥ 0 (10)
Because this allows the possibility of very weak “winners” (e.g. all options are tied), some authors extend
this to require that a weak CW is never defeated and defeats at least one:
∀β V (α : β) ≥ 0 ∧ ∃γ V (α : γ) > 0 (11)
This allows only non-trivial ties, such as A defeats C and ties B, while B defeats C and ties A, where both
A and B are weak CW. Further refinements of the CW criteria exist but are not necessary for our purposes.
As discussed in section (2.1), discrete jumps between options are appropriate to actual legislative votes,
while smoothly changing probabilities are more appropriate to generalized voting. An advantage of the
NPCE over DCE is that NPCE distinguishes between a strong CW which just barely defeats the other
options (marginal) and a strong CW which soundly defeats all others (robust). In the marginal case, the CW
is estimated to be just barely more likely than the second-most likely, while in the robust case the CW is
estimated to be much more likely than the second-most. For our purposes, the distinction between marginal
and robust CW is more important than the distinction between strong and weak CW. Consider the case that
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option A barely defeats B and soundly defeats C, while B barely loses to A and soundly defeats C. In the
DCE methodology, option A is ranked as the strong CW no matter how small the margin of victory, even
when they are insignificant round-off errors, until the discrete transition from “strong” to “weak” when the
tiny margin becomes exactly zero. When there is even a tiny margin of defeat (even round-off error), it is
classified as a Condorcet loser. With NPCE methodology, there are no discrete jumps between options as
the strength of their support varies, just smoothly declining probability from very high odds to nearly even.
When the context is clear, we often refer to the current positions of particular actors, θi, by just the index
i . The effort which actor k will exert to support option θi over option θj is vk(i : j). We do not consider
framing effects, so swapping i and j flips the sign:
vk(i : j) + vk(j : i) = 0 (12)
We will consider different models of third-party voting in section 3.6; for now we simply use vk(i : j). The set
of k with vk(i : j) > 0 are the coalition supporting i against j. While each model of the third-party choice
gives a different estimate of vk (i : j), the total capability of i’s coalition against j is always the sum of votes
for i against j:
Ci:j =
∑
vk(i:j)>0
vk (i : j) (13)
Equations (12) and (13) imply that
Cj:i =
∑
vk(i:j)<0
|vk (i : j) | (14)
Note that this includes the bilateral contributions of i and j themselves, which may be large or small
depending on how high are the stakes. By the symmetry of equation (12),
Cj:i =
∑
vk(j:i)>0
vk (j : i) (15)
Because every non-zero term in the sum for V (i : j) appears in either the sum for Ci:j or Cj:i, we have
V (i : j) = Ci:j − Cj:i (16)
In a political election, or a legislative vote, the winner is uniquely determined by the sign of the difference
in capabilities, e.g. 11 votes to 10. When the concept of exerting influence is extended from legislative votes
to more general contests of capability, then the outcome is not so clear-cut. For example, if one legislative
pressure group has $11 million to spend on lobbying efforts and the other has $10 million, then ceterus paribus
the probability of the former prevailing in a legislative vote should be only slightly better than 50%. The
probability that i will defeat j depends on the relative capability of the coalition supporting each, via the
simplest generalization of equation (1):
P [i ≻ j] =
Ci:j
Ci:j + Cj:i
= Pij (17)
To avoid division by zero errors and give 50 : 50 odds in the case of exact ties, a small positive constant
is added to each C before applying equation (17). A reasonable heuristic would be to make it a tiny fraction
of the root mean square of the Ci:j values. This also has the useful result that Pii =
1
2 , which means that
the purely formal contest i : i has 50% probability of each side winning, or 100% chance that i will remain if
no other actor challenges it.
Note that Pij + Pji = 1 and that V (i : j) ≥ 0 if and only if Pij ≥
1
2 .
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3.4 LimitingDistribution
The MVT and derived models use the heuristic of repeated deterministic contests in Condorcet Election
to demonstrate that group decision making should converge to the median voter. The NPCE methodology
used the heuristic of a Markov process where repeated probabilistic contests yield a limiting distribution. As
mentioned earlier, this is not the only Markov model of probabilistic voting. Two examples of using NPCE
combined with a Markov model to estimate a limiting probability distribution are [STW06] and Zapal’s PhD
thesis, [JZ12]; several seminar presentations extracted from the thesis explore "simple Markovian equilibria
in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining".
The deterministic CW is defined by the heuristic of a full n2 deterministic Condorcet election. The
limiting distribution of a probabilistic Condorcet election can be computed by a heuristic of “fictitious play”.
Suppose pti is the probability of i at turn t. Then there are three ways that i could be chosen at turn t+ 1:
• Option i was chosen at time t, challenged by option j, and i defeated j
• Option i was chosen at time t, and not challenged.
• Option k was chosen at time t, challenged by option i, and i defeated k
As mentioned above, the situation of i not being challenged can be formally represented as i challenging i,
which results with certainty in i. We denote the probability of a challenge from j to i as cji, so the three
conditions can be combined to give the Markov transition probabilities as follows:
pt+1i = p
t
i
(∑
j 6=i cjiPij
)
+pti
(
1−
∑
j 6=i cji
)
+cik
(∑
k 6=i Pikp
t
k
) (18)
Because Pij + Pji = 1, the assumption that cji = 1/n yields the following:
pt+1i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Pij
(
pti + p
t
j
)
(19)
This can be expressed more concisely as the following vector equation:
pt+1 = T
(
P, pt
)
(20)
Equation (19) implies that each term of pti appears in
∑
i p
t+1
i with the coefficient
1
n
∑n
j=1 (Pij + Pji),
which is 1. This implies that ∑
i
pti = 1 ⇒
∑
i
pt+1i = 1 (21)
as required.
Equation (19) is essentially an eigenvector problem, so we can use similar solution techniques. One simple,
general method is the iterative Newton procedure:
pt+1 =
pt + T (P, pt)
2
(22)
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Starting from a uniform p0i =
1
n
distribution, it efficiently converges on the limiting distribution of the
Markov process, p = p∞:
p∞i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Pij
(
p∞i + p
∞
j
)
(23)
A little algebra shows that for the two-options case, we get exactly the intuitive expected result:
p1 =
C1:2
C1:2+C2:1
p2 =
C2:1
C1:2+C2:1
(24)
With more than two options, there is no simple closed form for the limiting distribution; the following
numerical example is purely for reference. For illustration, we have assumed that cji = 1/5 though other
assumptions could reasonably be made. The capabilities Cij were generated uniformly from [0,1], those on
the middle row were raised by 0.5 to make it the CW, and equation (17) was used to compute each probability.
P =


0.5000 0.4192 0.1814 0.8272 0.5211
0.5808 0.5000 0.3326 0.7129 0.1856
0.8186 0.6674 0.5000 0.7674 0.5043
0.1728 0.2871 0.2326 0.5000 0.1777
0.4789 0.8144 0.4957 0.8223 0.5000


(25)
p =


0.1597
0.1400
0.3401
0.0638
0.2964


(26)
3.5 Utility of a Contest
When advantageous, any actor i could initiate a one-on-one contest in order to get actor j to adopt their
position. Even if the contest does not actually occur, the possibility can be anticipated by both parties as
they consider what bargain to reach. If it were a strictly bilateral contest, where both sides exerted their
full capability, ci, we would expect the probability of winning to be determined by their relative capabilities,
similar to equation (1). However, it is unrealistic to model every conflict between actors as the most intense
conflict of which they are capable: if the difference in utilities were quite low, then one would expect little
effort to impose or resist. Because the actors have different utility functions, it is entirely possible for the
stakes to be very high for one actor and very low for the other.
The proportional voting rule of equation (3) leads to the following effort by each actor.
vi(i : j) = ci (Ui (θi)− Ui (θj)) ≥ 0
vj(i : j) = cj (Uj (θi)− Uj (θj)) ≤ 0
(27)
Thus, the probability of i winning depend on both the relative capabilities and relative stakes. We modify
equation (1) to use not the total capability available but only that amount justified by the stakes, as follows:
p [i ≻ j] = |vi(i:j)||vi(i:j)|+|vj(i:j)|
= vi
vi+vj
(28)
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For this particular model, we will assume that the utility to an actor i of a state where all other positions
are θj is simply the sum of the utilities of positions:
7
S = {θj}
Ui(S) =
∑
j Ui (θj)
(29)
For brevity, we will omit terms which cancel. Suppose actor i considers challenging actor j. Considered
as a bilateral contest, only θi and θj could change, so all other terms will be omitted from status quo utility:
Ui(S) = Ui (θi) + Ui (θj) (30)
The expected utility for party i in a contest against j rests on the assumption that the loser must adopt
the winner’s position. If i defeats j, then the new positions are θ′i = θi and θ
′
j = θi; the converse holds if j
defeats i. Thus, the expected utility of the outcome is as follows:
Ui(i : j) =
vi
vi+vj
(
Ui (θ
′
i) + Ui
(
θ′j
))
+
vj
vi+vj
(
Ui (θ
′′
i ) + Ui
(
θ′′j
))
= vi
vi+vj
(Ui (θi) + Ui (θi)) +
vj
vi+vj
(Ui (θj) + Ui (θj))
= 2
viUi(θi)+vjUi(θj)
vi+vj
(31)
Comparing Ui(i : j) to the status quo utility, we can see that i’s incentive to initiate a one-on-one contest
j is the following:
Ui(i : j)− Ui(S) =
vi − vj
vi + vj
(Ui (θi)− Ui (θj)) (32)
Taken by itself, equation (32) implies that each actor has an incentive to initiate a contest which depends
on the interaction of capability and stakes. Notice that it can be advantageous for a weak actor, i, to confront
a strong actor, j, if the stakes are small for the large actor yet high for the weak actor: ci < cj yet vi > vj
so Ui(i : j) − Ui(S) > 0. This dynamic is often cited as an explanation of how weak countries can defeat
strong countries, e.g. when the former fight without end on their home territory and the latter easily tire of
overseas expeditions.
However, all the third parties also have the opportunity to exert influence, so contests cannot be expected
to always remain bilateral between just two actors.
3.6 Third Party Support
As mentioned earlier, third parties are likely to gain or lose from a contest and hence have an incentive to
vote with vk(i : j). Those supporting i make up one coalition while those supporting j make another. In this
way, we can view the multilateral contest as a two-sided contest between two coalitions. The composition
and strength of the coalitions depend on the votes of third parties.
Third parties always have at least three options: support i, support j, or abstain. Again, one would
expect them to exert effort to support the party whose victory is most favorable to them. We assume that
the third parties have limited rationality in that they look at the first-order, local choices and consequences,
without complex game-theoretic consideration of others’ choices (which might be based on similarly complex
consideration of others’ choices, and so on.)
We model third party support as uncommitted, semi-committed, or fully committed.
7Other models might take the utility of a state to be the utility to i of the CW of the state. While this is intuitively appealing,
it introduces much more complexity.
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3.6.1 Support When Uncommitted
In the uncommitted case, third parties are not committed to adopt the position of whichever side they
support, but the loser of the bilateral contest is still forced to adopt the position of the victor. The expected
utility to k of supporting i would be simply the expected value of the two outcomes. If i and k together defeat
j, then i remains at their initial position θi, j must adopt position θi, and k can remain at position θk. If i and
k together lose to j, then i must adopt θj . When multiple actors form a coalition, the probability of victory
is determined by the strength of each coalition, which is taken to be the sum of their individual capabilities.
Because positions for i, j, and k are involved, we carry the terms of U(S′) and U(S′′) for all three positions:
Uuk (i, k : j) =
ci+ck
ci+ck+cj
(
Uk (θ
′
i) + Uk
(
θ′j
)
+ Uk (θ
′
k)
)
+
cj
ci+ck+cj
(
Uk (θ
′′
i ) + Uk
(
θ′′j
)
+ Uk (θ
′′
k )
)
= ci+ck
ci+ck+cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θk)) +
cj
ci+ck+cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θk))
(33)
Similarly for k supporting j:
Uuk (j, k : i) =
ci
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θk)) +
cj + ck
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θk)) (34)
As mentioned earlier, there are multiple voting rules discussed in the literature, our prototypes use several,
and expert judgment will be required to determine which is most appropriate for any given case. Because it
is analytically clearer, we will present the results only for proportional voting:
vuk (i : j) = wk (U
u
k (i, k : j)− U
u
k (j, k : i))
= wk
2ck
ci+ck+cj
(Uk (θi)− Uk (θj))
(35)
The particular case of equation (35) (uncommitted, proportional voting) is similar to the formula described
in [BDMNR85, BDM02], albeit with different notation.
3.6.2 Support When Semi-committed
Of course, many small nations have learned that it matters greatly whether their powerful allies win or lose,
because they win or lose with their patrons. In the semi-committed case, third party k can keep θk if on the
winning side but must adopt winner’s position otherwise:
Usk(i, k : j) =
ci + ck
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θk)) +
cj
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θj)) (36)
Similarly for k semi-committed to j:
Usk(j, k : i) =
ci
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θi)) +
cj + ck
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θk)) (37)
With proportional voting,
vsk(i : j) = wk (U
s
k (i, k : j)− U
s
k(j, k : i))
= wk
[
2ck
ci+ck+cj
(Uk (θi)− Uk (θj)) +
ci(Uk(θk)−Uk(θi))−cj(Uk(θk)−Uk(θj))
ci+ck+cj
]
(38)
This is simply the uncommitted case, plus a term corresponding to the danger of joining a losing coalition.
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3.6.3 Support When Fully Committed
In the fully-committed case, third party k must always adopt the winner’s position:
Ufk (i, k : j) =
ci + ck
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θi)) +
cj
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θj)) (39)
Similarly for k fully committed to j:
Ufk (j, k : i) =
ci
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θi)) +
cj + ck
ci + ck + cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θj)) (40)
With proportional voting,
vfk (i : j) = wk
(
Ufk (i, k : j)− U
f
k (j, k : i)
)
= wk
3ck
ci+ck+cj
(Uk (θi)− Uk (θj))
(41)
Taken together, equations (35) and (41) imply that modeling third parties as fully committed will increase
their effort by a factor of 3/2. As the behavior of the main parties is the same in either case, the choice of
voting rule can change the result of equation (17) because the purely bilateral contributions might dominate
in the uncommitted case while the larger third-party contributions might dominate in the fully committed
case.
Regardless of how committed the third parties might be if they support one side or another, they always
have the third option of abstaining with vk(i : j) = 0. In that case, the utility to actor k is just their own
expected utility of the bilateral contest:
Uak (i : j) =
ci
ci + cj
(Uk (θi) + Uk (θi) + Uk (θk)) +
cj
ci + cj
(Uk (θj) + Uk (θj) + Uk (θk)) (42)
If Uak (i : j) ≥ Uk(j, k : i) and U
a
k (i : j) ≥ Uk(i, k : j) then the utility of abstaining is greater than
the utility of supporting either side, and that particular third party will abstain. This represents the real-
world situation of “sitting on the fence” until it becomes clear that the dangers of full commitment or even
semi-commitment are worthwhile, i.e. until a “strong horse” emerges.
Again, equations like (35), (38), (41), (42) do not actually appear in our prototype implementations.
They implement the general NPCE method, and use the abstract computation. However, under each specific
parameterization, the behavior of the abstract method can be described by each specific equation, even though
the same abstract computation is used in each case. The situation is entirely analogous to linear programming,
where the general simplex algorithm can be applied to data sets with many different structures. For some
structures (e.g. multi-commodity flow), there exists more specific algebraic descriptions of how the general
algorithm behaves with that specific structure.
3.7 Search for a Condorcet Winner
Much of the literature uses an abstract model inspired by elections: the group simply selects one from a small
set of predefined options. The unidimensional issue set in the SPM is often characterized by the integers
from 0% to 100%, or even just the positions of a dozen or so actors: it is easy to check each option for
the CW. Even in multidimensional SPM, the positions currently held by actors is a small set that can be
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easily searched. With discrete, combinatorial issue sets, one quickly encounters enormous sets of options: the
“combinatorial explosion” of options is unavoidable.
In infinite (or just astronomically large) issue sets, it is generally impossible to analytically solve for the
CW, so any effective procedure - either for a modeling toolkit or a legislative process - must do some sort of
incremental exploration of the issue set, looking for local improvements until no more can be found. Both
hill-climbing and genetic search are examples. Each alternates between two steps: generating new local
options, and selecting which to discard and which to further improve. Because the complicated interactions
of the generation and search procedure are impossible to predict in detail (otherwise analytic solution for the
CW would be possible), the search for a CW in a large combinatorial issue set is similar to the “preference
construction” process described in [RD83] and discussed in [PE12]:
Alternatives are processed in pairs, with the values of the two alternatives compared on each
attribute, and the alternative with a majority of winning (better) attribute values is retained. The
retained option is then compared with the next alternative from the choice set, and this process
of pairwise comparison continues until all the alternatives have been evaluated and one option
remains.
This can be interpretted as a hill-climbing procedure to maximize the ω function of equation (4). The CPT
suggested that the observed convergence to definite legislative outcomes can be explained by the existence
of a CW, as well as by appeals to institutional structures. Modified for a two-sided comparison process,
this could just as well describe the classic “drift to war” (see section (1.1)) where each side observes the
behavior of the other side and responds as seems best at the time, the other side reacts similarly, and the
process continues. Each comparison of alternative responses can be seen as another one-on-one comparison
of options in an implicit Condorcet election, similar to the legislative process of voting on successive proposed
amendments.
In general, optimization algorithms can settle on different local optima based on their starting point and
search procedure; political scientists often refer to the real-world manifestation of this phenomenon as “path
dependence”. Therefore, researchers could pursue two different paths: model the particular incremental,
path-dependent search process applicable to their particular problem, or try to design a search algorithm
which is likely to find the true global optimum within reasonable time limits. However, the optimization
issues involved are not unique to the NPCE methodology, so they will not be discussed here.
4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has presented a mathematical framework that significantly extends the very successful voting
models inspired by the Median Voter Theorem (MVT). Two broad classes of generalization are described.
The limitation of previous methods to representing outcomes via uni-dimensional and continuous scales is
generalized to allow discontinuous and multidimensional spaces that can allow complex structured policies to
be analyzed. And by representing negotiation and bargaining as a non-deterministic processes this approach
will allow the exploration of possible outcomes in situations that are sufficiently complex and uncertain that
relying on deterministic forecasts could be misleading.
Increased computational power means that simplifications previously made for analytic tractability are no
longer required. The combination of the more general mathematical framework presented here and modern
computational resources now allow applications utilizing this framework where earlier simpler formulations
would not be suitable. Issues such as the formulation of legislation, the formation of coalition governments, the
influence of stakeholder groups on direct parties to negotiations and deliberations can now be analyzed using
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this framework. Further, the more general approach can serve to avoid the hazard of excluding important
information from analyses in order to make them feasible. Deterministic models have the potential to mislead
by portraying best estimate outcomes as certain, and the non-deterministic framework described here can
serve statistical properties of outcome distributions, which can be important when there are a large number
of complex policy options.
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